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COMMENTS 
Reimbursement of Defense Costs as a Condition 
of Probation for Indigents 
I. lNTRODUCITON 
In order that "the kind of trial a man gets . . . [ will not de-
pend] ... on the amount of money he has,"1 the Supreme Court 
in a series of landmark decisions2 has required the states to accord 
indigent defendants in criminal cases many of the rights thereto-
fore available only to those who could afford to assert them. As a 
result, the states have joined the federal government3 in bearing the 
financial burden of providing, at their own expense, an increasing 
number of legal services for indigent defendants. 
In an effort to recoup a portion of the public monies so ex-
pended, some state and federal courts have required convicted in-
digents to reimburse the government for the cost of the legal 
services provided. One method of recoupment requires the unsuc-
cessful indigent to make reimbursement of costs as a condition of 
probation.4 Typically, the probationer must reimburse the gov-
ernment in the form of small weekly or monthly installments. 
Payment may include the cost of court-appointed counsel, free 
transcripts, filing fees, and other government-provided legal as-
sistance. 
It is extremely difficult to obtain precise information concerning 
the prevalence of this practice. There is only one reported case on the 
subject,5 and empirical evidence is almost wholly lacking because 
of the wide discretion granted sentencing courts in imposing pro-
bation conditions, and because of the reluctance of appellate courts 
to review the exercise of that discretion. 6 However, courts have 
frequently imposed costs on nonindigent probationers,7 and in 
1. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
2. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The scope of these and other 
decisions concerning legal assistance for indigents is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 11-37, infra. 
3. Many of these rights have been guaranteed in federal courts for a number of 
years, either by virtue of court decisions, see, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938), or by virtue of legislative action, see, e.g., The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 
18 U.S.C. § 3006 A (1964). 
4. See D. OAKS, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE Ar::r IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59 (Comm. Print 1969). 
5. On June 19, 1969, while this Comment was in the final stages of printing, the 
Supreme Court of California held that the imposition of such a reimbursement 
condition was unconstitutional since it violated the defendant's free exercise of his 
sixth amendment right to ~unsel. In re Jennifer Grey Allen, Crim. No. 12,718 (Cal., 
filed June 19, 1969); LA. Trmes, June 21, 1969, pt. 2, at 1, col. 4. 
6. See text accompanying notes 44-65 infra. But see note 5 supra. 
7. See, e.g., People v. Marks, 340 Mich. 495, 65 N.W.2d 698 (1964); Ex parte Sethers, 
151 Tex. Crim. 553, 209 s:w .2d 358 (1948). See also Comment, Conditions of Probation 




many jurisdictions the statutes which authorize such a probation 
condition with respect to solvent probationers seem broad enough 
to include indigents as well.8 Moreover, two recent studies9 have 
unearthed specific data which verify that the condition is, in fact, 
being imposed on unsuccessful indigent defendants in a number 
of jurisdictions, both federal and state.10 Clearly, then, at least some 
courts have required reimbursement by indigent defendants as a 
condition of probation. The purpose of this Comment is to ex-
amine the constitutional validity and practical wisdom of imposing 
such a condition. 
II. SCOPE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS 
Before considering the legal and practical problems presented by 
the mandatory reimbursement of costs as a condition of probation, 
it is important to examine the scope of state and federal responsi-
bility to provide free services to the indigent. By far the most 
expansive and probably the most expensive right which the courts 
must now afford indigents is the right to counsel. Court-provided 
counsel is required, unless the right to it is waived, at all felony 
trials11 and at all other stages of a felony prosecution which are 
deemed "critical" to the determination of guilt or innocence, or to 
the assurance of a fair trial.12 Thus, counsel may be required not 
only at trial, but also at in-custody interrogations,13 arraignments,14 
In some cases the amount of reimbursement has been based on the total cost of 
the litigation or a fraction thereof. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Keenan, 178 Pa. Super. 
461, 116 A.2d 314 (1955). In other cases the probationer has been required to reimburse 
the state for only a specific part of its expenses. See, e.g., State v. Welkos, 14 Wis. 2d 
186, 109 N.W.2d 889 (1961); State v. Hardin, 183 N.C. 815, 212 S.E. 593 (1922). The 
court also may prescribe payment in terms of a specific amount unrelated to the total 
costs or any specific expense. Quality Egg Shippers v. United States, 212 F.2d 417 
(8th Cir. 1954); State v. Barnett, ll0 Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939). 
8. In some states the imposition of costs is specifically authorized as a condition 
of probation. See, e.g., COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 39-16-7 (1963); WIS. STAT. § 57.01(1) 
(1961); W. VA. ConE ANN. § 62-12-9 (1966). In other jurisdictions, statutes generally 
providing for probation conditions are broad enough to encompass imposition of costs. 
See, e.g., statutes cited in note 44 infra. 
9. See D. OAKS, supra note 4, at 58-59; Kamisar &: Choper, The Rights to Counsel 
in Minnesota-Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. R.Ev. 
1, 23-27 (1963). 
10. A few courts have required solvent probationers to reimburse the state for ex-
penses incurred by the prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Welkos, 14 Wis. 2d 186, 109 
N.W.2d 889 (1961) (cost of utilizing a private prosecutor); Commonwealth v. Keenan, 
178 Pa. Super. 461, 116 A.2d 314 (1955) (one half of the prosecution costs). Apparently, 
however, reimbursement by indigent probationers has been limited to the cost of 
their defense. 
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
12. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 
(1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
14. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
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preliminary examinations,15 police line-ups,16 and other pretrial 
stages of the prosecution.17 After trial, counsel must be provided 
£or the purpose of making a direct appeal from a felony convic-
tion,18 and probably £or the purpose of mounting a collateral at-
tack through a habeas corpus petition.19 In addition, counsel is 
required at certain post-sentencing proceedings which are part of 
the correctional process, notably at probation and parole revoca-
tion hearings.20 
It is unlikely that the list of judicial proceedings in which the 
indigent is entitled to assigned counsel has been exhausted. For 
example, counsel may be required at an increasing number of 
juvenile proceedings,21 and there is growing support from com-
mentators22 and courts23 £or the recognition of a constitutional right 
to appointed counsel at all misdemeanor prosecutions. As one im-
portant study concludes, "Indigent persons may find that they ... 
have been awarded absolute rights to assigned counsel ... every-
where a rich man may appear with counsel."24 Because of the high 
percentage of indigent criminal defendants,25 the assertion of their 
15. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). 
16. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
17. For a general discussion of right to counsel prior to arraignment, see Annot., 
5 A.L.R.3d 1269 (1966). 
18. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Boskey, The Right to Counsel in 
Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1961), Gerard, The Right to Counsel 
on Appeal in Missouri: A Limited Inquiry into the Factual and Theoretical Under-
pinnings of Douglas v. California, 1965 WASH. U. L.Q. 463. 
19. Johnson v. Avery, 37 U.S.L.W. 4128 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1969); Ashworth v. United 
States, 391 F.2d 245 (1968). See also Boskey, supra note 18, at 799-801. 
20. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). See also Cohen Sentencing, Probation, and 
the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1968); 
Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 
MINN. L. REv. 803 (1961); Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal Systems, 56 GEO. L.J. 
705, 721-23 (1968). But see Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Rose 
v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Hyser v. Reed, 
318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Lawson v. Coiner, 291 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. W. Va. 1968); 
Wingo v. Lyons, 432 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1968). 
21. The Supreme Court has upheld the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings 
which could lead to confinement. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
22. See, e.g., Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. 
REv. 685 (1968). See also Address of Dean Francis Allen of the University of Michigan 
Law School, at the University of Virginia Law School, April 11, 1969. 
23. See, e.g., James v. Headley, 37 U.S.L.W. 2611 (5th Cir. April 9, 1969); Boyer v. 
City of Orlando, 402 F.2d 1966 (5th Cir. 1968); Goslin v. Thomas, 400 F.2d 594 (5th 
Cir. 1968); Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965); McDonald v. Moore, 
353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); State v. Borst, 378 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967). 
24. Kamisar and Choper, supra note 9, at 7. 
25. An estimated thirty to sixty per cent (depending on the jurisdiction) of all 
those charged with felonies cannot afford to employ counsel. See, e.g., E. BROWNELL, 
LEGAL Am IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (1951); SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY DEFENDER SYS-
TEMS, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 80, 134-35 (1959); Silverstein, Manpower Re-
quirements in the Administration of Criminal Justice, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT! THE COURTS 
152, 154 (1967) (app. D) (estimating a median figure of 58% for all the states). For 
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rights would impose a great financial burden on the state and 
federal governments. 
Furthermore, legal assistance to indigents is not limited to pro-
viding counsel. Even before expanding the state responsibility for 
providing counsel, the Supreme Court moved to compel the pro-
vision of other kinds of services needed to obtain "equal justice" 
for indigents. In Griffin v. lllinois,26 the Court recognized that in-
digents are entitled to means of obtaining appellate review of 
criminal convictions on an equal basis with nonindigents. Spe-
cifically, the Court held that if transcripts of trial proceedings are 
needed to obtain review, the state must provide indigents with 
those transcripts free of charge. Subsequent decisions by the Su-
preme Court expanded the scope of Griffin's equal protection 
principle. For example, the Court has held that courts may not 
limit the indigent's access to appellate review or post-conviction 
relief by requiring the payment of a filing fee,27 or by conditioning 
the provision of a free transcript on a "nonfrivolous" allegation 
that grave or prejudicial errors had occurred at trial.28 In addition, 
the Court has extended the right to a free transcript to include 
transcripts of coram nobis hearings,29 habeas corpus hearings,30 evi-
dentiary hearings,31 and preliminary hearings.32 
While these decisions have greatly expanded the scope of state 
and federal responsibility, their potential impact is even greater.33 
If the quality of a man's defense is not to rest on the amount of 
money he has, a broad range of collateral assistance to indigents 
becomes necessary. In fact, without certain kinds of collateral as-
sistance, court-appointed counsel and the waiver of various fees 
and costs will often become empty promises of equal justice. For 
example, payment of expert witness fees and reimbursement of 
investigatory expenses could be even more critical to the defense 
of an indigent than court-appointed counsel.34 Recent develop-
the estimated number of indigent misdemeanor defendants, see Junker, supra note 22, 
at 716. 
26. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
27. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). 
28. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State 
Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam). See also Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 
(1964). 
29. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). 
30. Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966). 
31. Gardner v. California, 393 .U.S. 367 (1969). 
32. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967). 
33. For analyses of the potential impact on the Court's decisions in this area, see 
Kamisar and Choper, supra note 9; Simeone and Richardson, The Indigent and His 
Right to Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases, 8 ST. Louis U. L.J. 15 (1963); Willcox and 
Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 
l (1957); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 
47 MINN. L. REv. 1054 (1963). 
34. See United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 421 (M.D. Ala. 1963), holding that the 
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ments indicate that the state may be called upon to defray the cost 
of obtaining assistance from psychiatrists,85 handwriting experts,36 
and accountants.87 Indeed, in terms of practical effect, the payment 
of a wide range of general expenses and discovery costs seems just 
as vital to the indigent's defense as is the assistance of counsel. Con-
sequently those expenses are equally appropriate objects of govern-
mental assistance. It is clear, then, that current decisions have a 
substantial impact on the state and federal treasuries. However, it 
is questionable whether or not requiring the unsuccessful indigent 
to reimburse the state as a condition of probation is either a per-
missible or a practical means of dealing ·with this problem. 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REQUIRING REIMBURSEMENT OF 
COSTS As A CONDITION OF PROBATION 
A. The Difficulty of Obtaining Review: A Threshold Issue 
Probation is a widely used sentencing technique.88 As an alter-
native to imprisonment, it places primary emphasis on rehabilita-
tion of the convicted criminal through a concept of "individualized 
justice."89 The probation system is designed to promote rehabilita-
tion by adapting flexible correctional devices to individual cases. 
At the same time, it affords society a measure of retribution with-
out subjecting the convicted defendant to the frequently corrupting 
influence of institutional imprisonment.40 One of the fundamental 
elements of this flexible approach to rehabilitation is the imposition 
of probation conditions by the supervising court.41 These conditions 
sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel demands the provision 
for indigent defendants of reasonable attorney's fees for travel and interview of wit-
nesses. These investigative expenses are now available to indigents in federal courts 
under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1964). 
35. See Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), afj'd, 344 F.2d 672 
(5th Cir. 1965); cf. Greer v. Beto, 379 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1967). 
36. See People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966); cf. State v. Hancock, 
164 N.W.2d 330 (1969). 
37. See Note, supra note 33, at 1055. 
38. Detailed statistical data concerning the extent to which probation is employed 
as a sentencing device is not available in most jurisdictions. However, a few sample 
reports indicate that probation is frequently used. Federal reports show that on 
June 30, 1966, there were 38,659 persons under the supervision of the Federal Pro-
bation System. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, PERSONS UNDER 
THE SUPERVISION OF THE FEDERAL PROBATION SYSTEM-FlSCAL YEAR 1966, ix (1967). Sta• 
tistics for California indicate that during 1964, 13,348 persons, fifty-five per cent of 
those sentenced, were granted probation. CALIFORNIA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISIICS, 
DELINQUENCY AND PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA 164-65 (1964). The Model Penal Code con-
templates that probation will be the ordinary disposition of convicted defendants and 
that imprisonment will be the e.xception. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962). 
39. PROBATION AND CRillIINAL JUSTICE 225 {Glueck ed. 1933). 
40. D. DRESSLER, PROBATION AND PAROLE 7 {1951). 
41. For a detailed study of probation conditions, see Best &: Birzon, Conditions of 
Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEo. L.J. 809 (1963). 
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are intended to serve two basic purposes: They attempt to aid in 
rehabilitation by directing the probationer's conduct toward so-
cially acceptable norms,42 and they afford society a limited amount 
of protection from potential harm by regulating the probationer's 
behavior and assisting the court in its supervisory capacity.43 By 
virtue of statutory authority, sentencing courts generally exercise 
wide discretion in determining the type of conditions to be applied 
in individual cases.44 Accordingly, courts have imposed a wide 
variety of probation conditions. For example, they have required 
convicted criminals to report periodically to their probation of-
ficers,45 to support their dependents,46 to make restitution to the 
victims of their crimes,47 to join the Navy,48 to disclose the names 
of their criminal associates,49 and to submit to sterilization.50 
Appellate courts have generally upheld the validity of these 
conditions unless the trial court has grossly abused its discretion.51 
42. J. RUMNEY&: J. MURPHY, PROBATION AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT 89 (1952). 
43. l3est 8: l3irzon, supra note 41, at 810. 
44. In a few jurisdictions the statutes make it mandatory that the court impose a 
number of specific conditions in certain types of cases, but most of these statutes also 
grant the court discretion to impose additional conditions. See, e.g., Iu.. REv. STAT. 
cb. 38, § 117-2 (1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-9 (1966). In other jurisdictions the 
statutes specificially enumerate all conditions that may be imposed, but grant the 
court wide discretion in deciding whether to apply the conditions. See, e.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1968); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 168-2 (1953); TEX. CoDE 
CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12 (1966). Finally, in a large number of jurisdictions the statutes 
confer broad power on the trial court to impose any condition it deems reasonable. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964) ("sucb terms and conditions as the court deems best''); 
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-16-6 (1963) (conditions determined by the court "as it may 
deem best''); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2601 (Supp. 1967) (conditions "as the court in its 
sound discretion deems necessary and expedient''); Mn. ANN CODE art. 41, § 107(£) 
(1957) (conditions "determined solely by the judge"); MAss. GEN. LA.ws ANN. cb. 276 § 87 
(1968) ("sucb conditions as [the court] deems proper''). 
The Model Penal Code would authorize conditions "reasonably related to the 
rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible 
with his freedom of conscience." MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1(2)(1) (Proposed Official 
Draft, 1962). l3y contrast, a few states have delegated to administrative agencies the 
task of formulating probation conditions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4333 
(Supp. 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2241 (1964); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-9830 
(Supp. 1967). 
45. In some states this condition is specifically authorized by statute. See, e.g., 
ILL. REv. STAT. cb. 38 § 117-2(3) (1965): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 1015 (1959). 
46. See, e.g., Popham v. Spears, 204 Ga. 759, 51 S.E.2d (1949); Commonwealth v. 
Gross, 324 Mass. 123, 85 N.E.2d 249 (1949); State v. Jackson, 226 N.C. 66, 36 S.E.2d 706 
(1946); In re McClane, 129 Kan. 739 284 P. 365 (1930); City of New York v. Kreigel, 124 
Misc. 67,207 N.Y.S. 646 (Sup. Ct. 1924). 
47. See, e.g., Maurier v. State, 112 Ga. App. 297, 144 S.E.2d 918 (1965). See also l3est 
8: l3irzon, supra note 41, at 826. 
48. People v. Patrich, 118 Cal. 332, 50 P. 425 (1897). 
49. United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D.C. Mass. 1961). 
50. People v. l31ankenship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936). 
The defendant in this case understandably declined probation. A similar condition was 
held to be an abuse of discretion in In re Hernandez, No. 76,757 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa 
Barbara County, June 8, 1966). 
51. See Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 Coum. L. REv. 181 
(1967). See also l3est and Birzon, supra note 41, at 8ll; Hink, The Application of 
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This deference to the trial court can be partially explained by the 
broad power conferred on the sentencing court by the probation 
statutes and by the very fact that the defendant was convicted.152 
However, neither of these explanations can account fully for the 
extreme reluctance of appellate courts to apply minimal standards 
of review, particularly constitutional standards,53 to probation con-
ditions. 
In an effort to explain this reluctance further, appellate courts 
have traditionally relied on various theories concerning the basic 
nature of probation. The "act of grace" the~ry, for example, views 
probation as a privilege granted by the trial court. This theory ap-
parently originated with Escoe v. Zerbst, 154 in which the Supreme 
Court held that a hearing was not constitutionally required before 
probation could be revoked; it stated: "We do not accept the ... 
contention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution . . .. 
Probation ... comes as an act of grace ... and may be coupled 
with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may 
impose."55 Since Escoe, a number of courts have relied on the "act 
of grace" theory to support the proposition that a probationer may 
not challenge the validity of probation conditions56 and to deny the 
application of constitutional standards of review. The argument 
is simply that any sentence less than the maximum is an act of 
"charity from a forgiving sovereign,"57 and that the convicted de-
fendant must either accept without question whatever conditions 
are imposed or else decline probation altogether.58 
On practical grounds, however, the "act of grace" theory is 
simply not descriptive of the probation system as it exists today. 
The grant of probation is not a personal act of grace by the court, 
but an almost mechanical function of a highly institutionalized 
Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 484 (1962); Note, 
A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility in Administering Probation, 71 YALE L.J. 
553 (1962). 
52. See Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, supra note 51, at 202. 
53. For an example of judicial reluctance to apply constitutional standards to the 
review of probation conditions, see Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th 
Cir. 1945). Exceptions to this general pattern, however, are People v. Becker, 349 
Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957) and In re Jennifer Grey Allen, Crim. No. 12, 718 
(Cal., filed June 19, 1969). 
54. 295 U.S. 490 (1935). Cf. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932). 
55. 295 U.S. at 492-93. 
56. See, e.g., People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 2d 75, 323 P.2d 397, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 
(1958); People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P .2d 352 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); 
State v. Giraud, 68 Wash. 2d 176, 412 P.2d 104 (1966); cf. Springer v. United States, 
148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945). 
57. Kadish, supra note 20, at 826. 
58. "The granting of probation is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial 
court; a defendant has no right to probation; he does have a right, if he feels that the 
terms of probation are more harsh than the sentence imposed by law, to refuse proba-
tion and undergo such sentence." People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 2d 75, 103, 323 P.2d 397, 413 
(1958). 
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and somewhat impersonal system which administers to thousands 
of offenders each year.159 The systematic grant of probation to large 
numbers of convicted criminals over a period of many years has 
removed from the process all aspects of charity.60 Indeed, our crimi-
nal system may have reached the point at which the convicted 
criminal is virtually entitled to probation or to some other rehabili-
tative disposition rather than to incarceration for the maximum 
term. Moreover, whatever validity the "act of grace" theory may 
have as a descriptive term, it should not serve to preclude legal 
analysis of probation conditions according to traditional constitu-
tional standards. Even if probation can to some extent be viewed 
as a privilege, it is now settled that the state cannot condition the 
grant of a privilege on illegal or unconstitutional restrictions, nor 
on an uninformed waiver of constitutional rights.61 Therefore, even 
if courts continue to look upon probation as an "act of grace," they 
should apply constitutional standards in reviewing the validity of 
probation conditions.62 
A second major theory advanced by trial and appellate courts to 
limit the application of normal standards of review is the "contract" 
theory. According to this theory, probation is no more than a con-
tract by which the state promises to forgo imprisonment in return 
for the defendant's promise to abide by certain conditions.63 Once 
the prisoner accepts probation, the argument runs, he has no right 
to challenge the validity of the conditions since they form his part 
of the "agreement."64 The contract theory, however, should not 
prohibit constitutional challenges to the validity of probation con-
ditions. As several commentators have noted,65 probation is ob-
viously not a mutual agreement, since the probationer is hardly in 
an equal position to bargain for restrictions on his behavior in re-
turn for limited freedom. The contract theory, then, relies on an 
59. See the statistics cited in note 38 supra. See also Kadish, supra note 20, at 826. 
60. See Kadish, supra note 20, at 827. 
61. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 
350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952). 
62. See Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 98-102 (1968) (Judge Celebrezze, dissenting); 
Best &: Birzon, supra note 41, at 832-33; Hink, supra note 51; Kadish, supra note 20, at 
826-28; Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, supra note 51, at 188-91. 
63. See, e.g., McGrew v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 838, 215 S.W .2d 996 (1948); Com-
monwealth v. Gross, 324 Mass. 123, 85 N.E. 2d 249 (1949); State v. Collins, 247 N.C. 248, 
100 S.E.2d 492 (1957); State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 62 S.E.2d 495 (1950); State v. 
Shepherd, 187 N.C. 609, 122 S.E. 467 (1924); Glenn v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 312, 327 
S.W.2d 763 (1959). 
64. "The relationship existing between the court and one granted probation under 
••• [law] ••• is contractual in nature in that the court agrees with the accused the 
clemency by way of probation will be extended if he will perform certain requirements 
and conditions, the violation of which will authorize revocation of probation." Glenn 
v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 312, 314, 327 S."W.2d 763, 764-65 (1959). 
65. See, e.g., Best and Birzon, supra note 41, at 832-33; Kadish, supra note 20, at 
826-28; Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, supra note 51, at 191-93. See 
also, Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 99-100 (6th Cir. 1968) (Judge Celebrezze, dissenting). 
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analogy which is inapposite to the situation at hand, and thus it 
cannot absolve the court from examining the constitutionality of 
probation conditions. 
B. Rinaldi v. Yeager 
Although there are no Supreme Court decisions dealing specif-
ically with the constitutionality of a probation condition which im-
poses costs on indigent defendants, 66 the Court discussed such a 
condition indirectly in the recent case of Rinaldi v. Yeager.61 In 
that case, the Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey statute 
which allowed the state to withhold prison wages from unsuccessful 
indigent defendants in order to pay for state-provided transcripts 
used on appeal. Because the statute did not impose a similar burden 
on indigents who were convicted but not imprisoned, the Court 
found that it constituted an arbitrary classification violative of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In denying 
the state's argument that the classification could be justified on the 
basis of administrative convenience, since it would be difficult to 
demand repayment from indigents who had not been imprisoned, 
the Court noted that "repayment could easily be made a condition 
of probation or parole .... "68 It cited as support a detailed study00 
which indicated that some judges in one jurisdiction "require, as a 
condition of probation, that the convicted indigent repay the 
county's expenditure for his lawyer."70 The persuasiveness of the 
Court's statement, however, is undercut not only by the lack of 
analysis, but also by the fact that the study cited in support of that 
statement expressed grave doubts both as to the constitutionality 
and as to the ·wisdom of requiring reimbursement as a condition of 
probation.71 Moreover, even if the dictum in Rinaldi could be inter-
preted as approval of such a condition, the fact that the constitu-
tional validity of the condition was not at issue in that case suggests 
that the question is still open. The Court may have seized upon 
the equal protection rationale in order to avoid the difficult ques-
tions raised by the petitioner's alternative argument-that the 
66. The Supreme Court of California, however, has struck down such a condition 
as unconstitutional. In re Jennifer Grey Allen, Crim. No. 12, 718 (Cal., filed June 19, 
1969). See note 5 supra. Moreover, in United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962), the court dealt with an analogous problem on non• 
constitutional grounds. Revocation of an indigent's probation had been ordered by the 
lower court when the defendant allegedly violated a condition of probation by failing 
to pay a fine. In reversing the order, the court held that revocation of probation under 
the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964), must take into account the 
probationer's indigency when the alleged violation is failure to pay a fine. 
67. 384 U.S. 305 (1966). 
68. 384 U.S. at 310. 
69. Kamisar &: Choper, supra note 9. 
70. 384 U.S. at 310 note 5. 
71. Kamisar and Choper, supra note 9, at 25-26. 
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statute in question represented an unconstitutional limitation on 
his right to appeal.72 In any event, the Court in Rinaldi did not 
consider the many constitutional difficulties attendant upon the 
imposition of conditions. 
C. Potential Chilling Effects and the Problem of Waiver 
If convicted indigents are required to reimburse the court for 
the cost of their defense, they may choose to forgo counsel and other 
legal assistance in the first instance in order to avoid the potential 
burden of repayment. Such a requirement exerts what the Supreme 
Court has characterized in other contexts as a "chilling effect" on 
the defendant's freedom to exercise his constitutional rights.73 In 
United States v. ]ackson,74 the Court held unconstitutional a section 
of the Federal Kidnapping Act75 which provided that the death 
penalty for kidnapping could be imposed only by jury verdict. Since 
a defendant faced the possibility of death with a jury trial but not 
with trial before a judge, the Court found that the statute violated 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment because it discouraged 
unnecessarily the defendant's exercise of the sixth amendment right 
to trial by jury and his fifth amendment right to plead not guilty. 
Similarly, the requirement that an indigent defendant reimburse 
the state for the cost of his defense exerts a chilling effect on the 
exercise of his constitutional rights.76 
For these purposes, however, the term "indigent" should be 
taken to refer only to one who cannot afford to pay for such as-
sistance either at the time of arraignment and trial or during the 
period of probation. If a defendant is indigent merely at the time 
of arraignment and trial and later becomes solvent or partially sol-
vent, and if the court adjusts the reimbursement condition of 
probation to the amount of payments that the probation can afford, 
72. 384 U.S. at 307-08: 
Rinaldi attacked the constitutionality of this statute on the basis of our decisions 
defining the duty of a State, under the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause, not to limit the opportunity of an appeal in a criminal case 
because of the appellant's poverty. • • • A logical extension of • • • [our] • • . 
decisions, the appellant contends, would prohibit a State from discouraging an 
indigent's freedom to appeal by saddling him with the obligation of paying for 
the cost of a transcript in the event his appeal is unsuccessful. We do not reach 
this contention, however, because we find the statute constitutionally deficient 
upon a different ground. 
73. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968); cf. United States v. Robel, 389 
U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960). 
74. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
75. 18 U.S.C. § 120I(a) (1964). 
76. This was apparently the basis for the California supreme court's holding that 
such a requirement was unconstitutional. In re Jennifer Grey Allen, Crim. No. 12,718 
(Cal., filed June 19, 1969); L.A. Times, June 21, 1969, pt. 2, at 1, col. 4. See note 5 
supra. Although the reimbursement condition may also chill the prisoner's decision to 
accept probation, the chilling effect rendered impermissible by the due process clause 
has to date been limited to the chilling of constitutional rights. 
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consistent with his earning capacity and family obligations,77 then 
that condition would appear to be constitutionally permissible. It 
would not chill the free exercise of his rights so long as he knows 
at the time those rights arise that he must reimburse the state only 
to the extent that he could reasonably afford to do so.78 While this 
knowledge might still have some inhibitory effect on his willingness 
to exercise his rights, that effect would be the same as that which 
a nonindigent defendant faces when he must decide whether or not 
to hire an attorney or to incur other defense costs.79 In both cases, 
the defendant knows that he will have to pay some money but 
realizes that he will be able to do so without undue hardship.80 
Since the reimbursement-of-costs requirement, when unadjusted 
to the defendant's ability to pay, chills the free exercise of his right 
to counsel and to other forms of legal assistance, 81 the question 
becomes whether or not that chilling effect makes the condition 
per se unconstitutional. In Jackson the Court stated that "the ques-
tion is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than 
intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and 
therefore excessive."82 Thus, the constitutionality of the reimburse-
ment condition depends on whether or not it is in any sense neces-
sary. Because the state could presumably cover the cost of services 
to indigents by the traditional means of increased taxation or re-
allocation of general revenues, 83 it does not appear that required 
77. In making this adjustment, the court would not only have to make an initial 
determination, when imposing the condition, of what the probationer could prospec-
tively afford, but it would also have to review that determination continually though-
out the probation period in order to discover whether or not the probationer could 
in fact continue to pay the original amount. If it found at any time that the probationer 
is unable in good faith to continue payments on the schedule initially imposed, the 
court, in order to prevent an unconstitutional chilling effect, would be required to 
terminate the condition, to modify it, or to suspend it until he could resume pay-
ments. 
78. The court must take pains to make this fact very clear to the indigent at the 
time his rights arise. If it tells him merely that he will have to repay the state for the 
costs of his defense without also carefully explaining that the amount and schedule of 
payments will be adjusted to what he can reasonably afford, the condition will have 
the same chilling effect as it would if it were imposed on all indigents without 
adjustment. 
79. Thus the imposition of a court-adjusted condition would not seem to violate the 
equal protection clause. See text accompanying notes 96-99 infra. 
80. Even if the adjusted reimbursements condition is constitutional, however, it is 
questionable whether or not it is wise as a practical matter. Since the primary purpose 
of repayment conditions is to raise revenue for the state (see text accompanying note 4 
and following note 37 supra), the amount the.state would receive by imposing a court-
adjusted condition on an indigent should be weighed against the potential cost of 
administering that condition. If, for example, the cost of determining how much a 
probationer can afford both initially and throughout the probation period (see note 77 
supra) would be quite large, and if the periodic amounts that he will be able to repay 
appear to be relatively small, it might not be worthwhile for the court to impose the 
condition. 
81. See text accompanying notes 76 supra. 
82. 390 U.S. at 582. 
83. In this regard, it should be noted that some courts have imposed the condition 
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reimbursement is necessary for the state to pay its costs. Thus, the 
argument for necessity must be made with respect to the effect of 
the condition on the indigent himself. In this regard, it might be 
suggested that required reimbursement is necessary for effective 
rehabilitation. However, whatever the practical rehabilitative merits 
of required reimbursement,84 the gamut of other rehabilitative de-
vices and conditions available85 and the fact that rehabilitation of 
nonindigent probationers has traditionally been possible without 
requiring payment of any kind indicate that the reimbursement 
condition is not necessary to the rehabilitation process. 
It might be argued, however, that although required reimburse-
ment of costs is not generally necessary, it is necessary in the case 
of indigents in order to deter false claims of indigency86 and 
frivolous defenses and appeals. Repayment as a condition of proba-
tion would undoubtedly have the desired deterrent effect; persons 
with spurious claims of indigency would be deterred from asking 
for counsel and other legal assistance. Such a deterrent, however, 
would not operate selectively on those defendants with false claims. 
True indigents with meritorious defenses would also be deterred 
from asserting their constitutional rights. Moreover, if it is in fact 
necessary to deter as many false and frivolous claims as possible, it 
does not follow that mandatory reimbursement is the most appro-
priate method. Several other techniques, including the straight-
fonvard proposal for extensive investigation of each claim at the 
time it is presented, would seem to be more efficient.87 Thus, it 
appears that the chilling effect of the mandatory reimbursement 
condition on an indigent's free exercise of his constitutional rights 
cannot be justified on the basis of necessity. 
A closely related constitutional objection is that an indigent de-
fendant cannot make a valid waiver of his right to legal assistance 
after he has been advised of the possibility of mandatory reim-
bursement. Generally, a valid waiver of the right to counsel, and 
presumably of the right to other types of legal assistance, must 
involve an intelligent and competent decision.88 Because of the 
on a theory of restitution. (See D. OAKS supra note 4, at 58-59). Courts have frequently 
imposed conditions of probation which require the convicted defendant to make 
restitution to the victims of his crime. See, e.g., Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950); People v. Marin, 147 Cal. App. 2d 625, 305 
P .2d 659 (1957). However, "the implicit analogy to the return of stolen property is not 
apposite in the area of legal defense services, which, it should be remembered, are 
constitutionally required." D. OAKS, supra note 4, at 59. 
84. See text accompanying notes 108-14 infra. 
85. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 44-50 supra. 
86. A recent study indicates that false claims of indigency are the most common 
abuse of the system for appointing counsel. See Note, The Representation of Indigent 
Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 579 (1963). 
87. Note, supra note 86. 
88. "The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of 
itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-whose life or liberty is at 
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strong presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, the 
decision to forgo counsel and other assistance must be clearly 
voluntary and knowledgeable.89 Accordingly, an indigent defen-
dant's unwillingness to undertake the obligation of repayment may 
so color his decision to waive his rights that the waiver could not 
be considered valid. Even if a court tried to keep the repayment 
condition secret until after appointment of counsel in an effort to 
remove it as a factor in the defendant's decision, repeated use of 
the condition will make it a matter of public knowledge. Moreover, 
any attempt to keep the practice secret would remove one of the 
primary reasons offered for its use-the deterrence of false claims 
of indigency. 
D. Objections Based on the Equal Protection Clause 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has focused on the equal 
protection clause as a bar to discrimination on the basis of economic 
status.1!0 Griffin, for example, stated that "a State can no more dis-
criminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, 
or color."91 In this regard, imposing reimbursement as a condition 
of probation may result in unconstitutional discrimination against 
the convicted indigent.92 
The trial court should not constitutionally be permitted to base 
its initial decision to grant probation solely on the indigent de-
fendant's prospective ability to pay.93 The convicted indigent defen-
dant is typically an unskilled and unemployable person and his 
prospects for obtaining worthwhile employment at the time of his 
conviction may be minimal. If he is qualified for probation on all 
other grounds, he should not be denied the rehabilitative advan-
tages of probation merely because of his prospective inability to 
stake-is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty 
responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and 
competent waiver by the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). 
89. United States v. McGee, 355 U.S. 17 (1957) (per curiam); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 
332 U.S. 708 (1948). See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) 
("courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental rights); 
Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882). 
90. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia .Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
91. 351 U.S. at 17. 
92. One state court has suggested that imposition of costs on indigent defendants 
constitutes a denial of equal protection. Ex parte .Banks, 74 Okla. Crim. 1, 6, 122 P.2d 
181, 184 (1942) (dictum). Presumably, equal protection arguments will apply to the 
federal government as well as to the states, either through the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment, or by virtue of the Supreme Court's suprvisory power over the federal 
judiciary. See, e.g., .Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("discrimination by the 
[federal government] may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.") 
93. For an analysis of the various factors which may enter into the trial judge's 
decision to grant probation, see Comment, Probation in Philadelphia: Judicial Decision 
and Constitutional Norms, 117 U. PA. L. Rl.v. 323 (1968). 
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reimburse the state; to deny probation for such a reason clearly 
discriminates against the indigent on account of his poverty. 
Similarly, once probation is granted, it should not be revoked 
solely because the indigent probationer is unable to make reim-
bursement.94 Since such a probationer may have difficulty in ob-
taining steady employment,95 he may at some point be unable to 
make installment payments to the state in spite of a good-faith 
effort. If the condition is strictly applied in these circumstances, the 
court will revoke probation and reinstate a prison sentence. Such 
a revocation is a violation of the equal protection clause since it 
represents an arbitrary discrimination based on the probationer's 
economic status. 
Here against the term "indigent" should not be taken to refer 
to one who has become solvent at the time of probation.96 Thus, 
if the court, in administering the reimbursement condition, adjusts 
the amount and the schedule of payments to ones which the proba-
tioner can reasonably meet,97 and if revocation is reserved for those 
who refuse to make bona fide efforts to fulfill their obligations, the 
condition would not violate the equal protection clause.98 In this 
case, the indigent is being treated in the same way as a nonindigent 
-he must pay for the cost of his defense but only because he can 
afford to do so.99 
In connection with the equal protection argument, it is not 
suggested that every prisoner must be offered probation on pre-
cisely the same terms, but rather that differences in probation con-
ditions should be justified on grounds that bear a reasonable 
relationship to the goals of probation, principally, rehabilitation.100 
If it is countered that the payment of money to the court has a 
rehabilitative purpose,101 it is fair to ask whether or not nonin-
digents are being required to pay part of their earnings into a court 
savings account to be returned to them upon completion of proba-
tion in order to teach them financial responsibility.102 If not, it can 
be concluded that the payment has no reasonable relationship to 
94. Violation of a probation condition usually results in revocation of probation 
and reinstatement of the suspended prison sentence. See generally Note, Legal Aspects 
of Probation Revocation, 59 COLUM, L. R.Ev. 311 (1959). 
95. See text following note 94 supra. 
96. See text preceding note 77 supra. 
97. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. 
98. Here again, however, the practical wisdom of imposing an adjusted reimburse-
ment condition on a probationer is dubious. See note 80 supra. 
99. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra. 
100. The equal protection clause requires that, in defining a class subject to legisla-
tion, the distinctions that are drawn have "some relevance to the purpose for which the 
classification is made." Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966); Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965); Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928}, 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). 
101. See text accompanying notes 108-14 infra. 
102. See text accompanying notes 110-13 infra. 
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rehabilitation and thus results in unconstitutional discrimination 
against the indigent. 
It can be argued on several other grounds that the reimburse-
ment condition represents a classification which is unreasonable or 
arbitrary and therefore violative of the equal protection clause.103 
For example, a reverse application of the Court's rationale in 
Rinaldi indicates that it may be unconstitutional to require reim-
bursement from indigents on probation while not requiring it from 
those in prison. It has also been suggested that the probation con-
dition is unconstitutional because it requires reimbursement from 
convicted defendants without also compelling repayment from those 
who were acquitted.104 However, it seems that at least the distinc-
tion between convicted and acquitted defendants can be justified 
on rational grounds. The acquitted indigent defendant has been 
forced by the state to defend himself against a charge which has 
been proved to be without merit, and consequently he should not 
be required to contribute his future earnings to repay the court for 
the cost of his defense. 
E. Thirteenth Amendment Questions 
A final constitutional objection to the required reimbursement 
condition can be dra,rn from the recent case of Wright v. Mat-
thews.105 In that case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
reversed a lower court decree sentencing a convicted indigent to a 
period of imprisonment plus "'such [further] time as may be re-
quired to pay the costs herein, unless such costs are sooner paid.' "100 
The court held that costs assessed against a convicted indigent can-
not be made part of his punishment, and that the decree of the 
lower court imposed an involuntary servitude proscribed by the 
thirteenth amendment.107 A similar analysis might be made in the 
situation in which the court revokes probation for failure to meet the 
repayment schedule. Although this situation can be distinguished 
from Wright because revocation of probation is merely a reinstate-
ment of a suspended sentence rather than a part of the original 
sentence, 108 the fact remains that additional punishment is being 
imposed solely for nonpayment of costs. Thus, under the rationale 
103. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 
384 U.S. 305 (1966); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
535 (1942). 
104. See D. OAKS, supra note 4 at 58. 
105. 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968). 
106. 163 S.E.2d at 159. 
107. For a discussion of involuntary servitude and peonage under the thirteenth 
amendment, see Brodie, The Federally-Secured Right to be Free from Bondage, 40 
GEO. L.J. 367 (1952); Shapiro, Involuntary Servitude, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 65 (1964). 
108. See note 99 supra. 
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of the court in Wright, the revocation of probation for failure to 
reimburse the state might well be a violation of the thirteenth 
amendment. 
IV. PRACTICAL REHABILITATIVE MERITS OF REQUIRING 
REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS As A CONDITION OF 
PROBATION FOR INDIGENTS 
Even if the constitutional objections to the required reimburse-
ment condition are unfounded, the condition is still impermissible 
if it has no practical justification as a means of promoting re-
habilitation.109 Several arguments have been advanced to justify 
payment to the court as an aid in the rehabilitation of the proba-
tioner. It is argued, for example, that such a requirement con-
stantly reminds the probationer of his wrongdoing and awakens his 
sense of obligation to society.11° Furthermore, mandatory reimburse-
ment is said to promote rehabilitation by directing the probationer's 
conduct toward socially acceptable norms, by teaching him financial 
responsibility, and by encouraging payment of debts.111 
One experienced state judge has proposed a mandatory "work, 
earn, and save" program for an analogous situation.112 Under this 
program, the financially irresponsible probationer is required to 
pay into court that portion of his weekly or monthly earnings 
which exceeds the subsistence level for himself or his family; these 
periodic payments go into a savings account which is paid over to 
the defendant at the expiration of his probation. The program is 
designed to help rehabilitate the probationer by teaching him the 
virtues of financial responsibility.113 Perhaps a similar effect is ob-
tained when an indigent probationer pays for the cost of his unsuc-
cessful defense. Even though the direct financial benefit accrues to 
the state instead of to the probationer himself, it could be argued 
that the rehabilitative effects are the same: the probationer might 
be motivated to obtain employment, to save his earnings, to provide 
for his dependents, and to lead a more useful life. 
Whether or not the required reimbursement condition would 
indeed have these salutary effects is largely a matter of speculation, 
since empirical data is wholly lacking. It appears, however, that the 
desired results would not be achieved. Unlike the "work, earn, and 
save" program, the probation requirement for reimbursement of 
109. In theory, at least, any condition of probation must be capable of justification 
on the ground that it promotes rehabilitation. See generally J. RUMNEY & J. MURPHY, 
supra note 42. 
110. See Best & Birzon, supra note 41, at 819. 
111. Id. 
112. A. GWYNN, WoR!!:, EARN, AND SAVE (1963) (Allen H. Gwynn is a judge of the 
Superior Court of North Carolina). 
11!1. Id. 
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costs does not refund the probationer's money at the end of his 
term. Thus, while the "work, earn, and save" program provides 
positive incentive to participate, it is hardly likely that the indigent 
probationer would be encouraged by the knowledge that his pay-
ments will inure to the state. Moreover, the probationer will recog-
nize that the state's real objective is to recoup whatever losses it can 
while he is still in its custody. Far from kindling enthusiasm to 
work hard and to earn money in a socially acceptable manner, then, 
the reimbursement condition may embitter him further, rob his 
incentive, and dim his enthusiasm. In this regard, one commenta-
tor has noted that probation conditions which there is no incentive 
to fulfill nearly always work to the detriment of the probationer.m 
Consequently, it appears highly unrealistic to expect that an in-
digent probationer will be in any way rehabilitated by the require-
ment that he repay the state for the right to assert his constitutional 
rights. While one might sympathize with the courts' efforts to 
reduce public spending in this area, it seems at least highly unwise, 
if not unconstitutional, to use the probation condition for that 
purpose. 
114. Doyle, Conditions of Probation: Their Imposition and Application, 17 FED. 
PROB. 18, 20 (Sept. 1953). 
